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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
No. 18-2168 
________________ 
 
WILLIAM A. REED, JR, as personal representative for ELSIE M. REED,  
an incompetent individual, and WILLIAM A. REED, JR., individually, 
  
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KAREN SCHEFFLER, Mayor of the Borough of Palmyra; 
*TRACY KILMER, Housing Official, Borough of Palmyra; 
*BOROUGH OF PALMYRA 
 
*Dismissed Pursuant to Clerk’s Order dated 9/26/18 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-00423) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on January 25, 2019  
 
Before:  JORDAN, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 24, 2019) 
 
 
OPINION∗ 
 
 
                                              
∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
William Reed alleges that the mayor of his town violated his free speech rights 
when she criticized the condition of property owned by Reed’s mother.  He contends that 
the mayor’s statements, made in the local newspaper, constituted “viewpoint 
discrimination” because they were harmful criticisms directed only at his mother’s 
property.  Because the District Court did not err in dismissing Reed’s claims, we will 
affirm.   
I1 
 In 2014, Reed had a power of attorney to act for his mother during the sale of her 
house in the Borough of Palmyra, New Jersey.  As part of the property sale process, the 
owner of the home was required to obtain a Certificate of Occupancy (CO) by passing an 
inspection of the house by the Borough.  Following the inspection, the Borough required 
that thirty-three code violations be remedied prior to the issuance of a CO.  Reed 
corrected the code violations, and the property passed a subsequent inspection.  As a 
result, the Borough issued a CO and the house was sold several months later.   
In early 2015, Reed spoke at an official session of the Borough Council, where he 
“told the Borough Council that he wanted them to be aware of the hardship and expense 
he experienced in the sale of the family home.”2  Two days later, the online edition of the 
Burlington County Times published statements made by the Mayor of Palmyra, Karen 
                                              
1 For purposes of resolving this motion to dismiss, we assume all facts alleged in 
the complaint are true.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
2 App. 39. 
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Scheffler, in response to Reed’s comments at the Borough Council meeting.  According 
to Scheffler: 
• The house was in extreme disrepair—dangerous even—and had been vacant 
for some time. 
• Properties of this sort negatively affect the entire neighborhood and bring 
down property values. 
• The property was a real eyesore for the neighborhood and a liability for Mr. 
Reed. 
• The property had too many problems. 
• There were many deficient areas, including electrical and plumbing problems, 
numerous holes, leaks, lack of CO detectors, a lack of hot water, crumbled 
chimney cement, no working stove and exposed wiring.3 
Reed filed a complaint in the District of New Jersey against the Borough of 
Palmyra, Scheffler, and the Borough’s Housing Official, Tracy Kilmer.  He alleged, in 
relevant part, that Scheffler (1) violated his rights to free speech and to petition the 
government under the United States and New Jersey constitutions and (2) defamed him.  
Scheffler filed a motion to dismiss all counts against her for failure to state a claim, and 
the District Court granted the motion.  Following the District Court’s denial of Reed’s 
motions for reconsideration and for leave to amend his complaint, all causes of action 
against the Borough and Kilmer were resolved and this appeal followed.  
In this appeal, Reed challenges the dismissal of two claims he brought against 
Scheffler:  (1) Count V, for alleged violation of the First Amendment, pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) Count VI, for alleged violation of the right to freedom of speech 
and to petition the government, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:6-2(c) and Article I, ¶¶ 1 and 18 
                                              
3 App. 39-40. 
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of the New Jersey Constitution.  Neither party challenges the District Court’s conclusion 
that the analysis for both claims is identical. 
II4 
Reed’s sole argument on appeal is that Scheffler violated Reed’s right to free 
speech by failing to act in a viewpoint neutral manner.5  However, in this case, Reed does 
not allege the existence of any government restriction on his speech, nor does he allege 
that he was unlawfully prevented from speaking freely before the Palmyra Borough 
Council.  Instead, he contends that Scheffler’s statements to the press—i.e., government 
speech—should have been viewpoint neutral.   
The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion that government speech 
must be viewpoint neutral, holding that “the First Amendment does not say that . . . 
government entities must abridge their own ability to speak freely,”6 and that “the 
Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.”7  This is 
because “[w]hen a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a 
particular viewpoint and rejects others.  The Free Speech Clause does not require 
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 
1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise “plenary review 
of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”  Encompass Ins. Co. v. Stone Mansion 
Rest. Inc., 902 F.3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2018).   
5 In this appeal, Reed abandons all claims based on a theory of retaliation.  
Similarly, Reed fails to raise any arguments challenging the District Court’s denial of his 
motion to amend the complaint.  In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 
237 (3d Cir. 2017) (“As a general matter, an appellant waives an argument in support of 
reversal if it is not raised in the opening brief.” (citing McCray v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. 
Co., 682 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir. 2012))).   
6 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2017). 
7 Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
5 
 
government to maintain viewpoint neutrality when its officers and employees speak 
about that venture.”8  Thus, the First Amendment did not require Scheffler to speak in a 
viewpoint neutral manner.  Reed’s argument to the contrary must fail.   
III 
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
8 Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1757. 
